Information search is critical in most decision-making tasks. An important aspect of information search is the stopping rule used by the decision maker to terminate information acquisition.
INTRODUCTION
Information search is a critical aspect of most decision-making tasks. Information is sought to illuminate possibilities, to structure problems, and to make choices or to design artifacts. A crucial assessment for a decision maker is establishing when acquired information is sufficient to continue to the next step in a decision-making process. Since the subsequent steps in the process typically rely on this acquired information, failures to gather adequate and/or appropriate information can have strong negative impacts on the eventual decision or problem-solving effort. The heuristics, or stopping rules, used by decision makers to decide when to terminate information search are the subject of the current research.
An important distinction can be made between information search in design and choice problems. Information search for design occurs early in a decision-making process, while information search for choice occurs later in the process (Simon, 1981) . The purposes of the search behavior in these two types of problems are generally different. The goal of design search behavior is to explore future possibilities and preferences, to structure the problem, and, in many cases, to determine what choices are available. Design problems are characterized by divergent thinking, in which the decision maker attempts to think in a variety of directions in open inquiry (Couger, 1996) .
In contrast, in choice problems the decision maker gathers evidence to select one or more of the available options. Choice is thus dominated by convergent thinking, in which the decision maker converges on a solution or choice (Couger, 1996; Guilford, 1957) .
Stopping rules for information search in choice problems have been investigated in excellent research by Gigerenzer and colleagues (e.g., Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer, Todd, and ABC Research Group, 1999; Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996) , Rapoport and colleagues (e.g., Busemeyer and Rapoport, 1988; Rapoport, 1966; Rapoport and Tversky, 1970; Seale and Rapoport, 1997) , Aschenbrenner, Albert, and Schmalhofer (e.g., 1984; Schmalhofer et al., 1986; Bockenholt et al., 1991) , and many others (e.g., Beach and Strom, 1989; Brickman, 1972; Busemeyer, 1982; Connolly and Gilani, 1982; Meyer, 1982; Saad and Russo, 1996; Svenson, 1992; Swensson and Thomas, 1974) . Stopping rules for information search in design problems have been studied much less. Understanding why decision makers terminate their information acquisition is critical, since the remaining stages of decision making (including choice) rely on the information gathered. Therefore, the current research focuses on stopping rules for information search in the design problem context.
The design setting we have chosen for investigating stopping rules is information systems development. This context has features characteristic of most design problems; e.g., there is a need for information gathering to determine goals, constraints, and alternatives for the eventual decision or artifact (Smith and Browne, 1993) . Information systems development requires an investigation of the functional and technical needs for the system together with an exploration of design alternatives.
It is generally recognized that gathering information from people who will eventually use an information system (the "users") is the most important stage in all of systems development (Davis, 1982; Leifer, Lee, and Durgee, 1994; Vessey and Conger, 1993; Watson and Frolick, 1993) . Termed "information requirements determination" in this context, the gathering of information allows systems analysts to build their understanding of the problem to be solved and the definition of the users' needs and expectations for a proposed system. The largest source of information systems development failures is incomplete and inaccurate information requirements (Bostrom, 1989; Byrd et al., 1992; Davis, 1982; Vessey and Conger, 1993; Watson and Frolick, 1993; Wetherbe, 1991; Whitten and Bentley, 1998) , and incomplete requirements account for approximately two-thirds of the maintenance costs for information systems (Lientz and Swanson, 1980; Ramamoorthy et al.,1984; Shemer, 1987) . Therefore, given the impact of requirements determination on eventual systems outcomes, information systems development is a useful design context for investigating stopping rule use in information search. Moreover, the similarity of the information gathering phase of systems development to most decision-making problems means that the results of the current research should be generalizable to many contexts.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sets the context for the research and reviews the use of stopping rules in information acquisition. This is followed by a description of the hypotheses tested and the methodology utilized. Finally, the results of an empirical study with practicing systems analysts are provided, followed by a discussion of the implications of this work for information search behavior.
STOPPING RULES IN INFORMATION SEARCH

Background
During a decision-making process, an individual expends costly resources (e.g., time and cognitive effort) in "predecisional information gathering in the hopes of reducing the risk of later decision error" (Connolly and Thorn, 1987, p. 397) . Information gathering requires that the individual make a judgment regarding the sufficiency of the information obtained and then decide whether to acquire additional information. Normatively, sufficiency is characterized by both the completeness and correctness of the information (Smith et al., 1991) . When a decision maker believes the acquired information is sufficient, he or she stops gathering additional information and moves to the next step in the decision-making process. For example, a city planner must decide when to stop gathering information from various constituents and begin to envision design alternatives. A person contemplating an automobile purchase must decide when to stop assessing his needs and preferences and begin to find cars that address those requirements. A systems analyst must decide when to stop gathering information from users and proceed with development of the system. Such situations have been termed "optional stopping problems" (Rapoport, Lissitz, and McAllister, 1972) .
In such problems, the decision maker invokes some heuristic or test, called a stopping rule, to determine the completeness or sufficiency of the information obtained.
A person applying a stopping rule has the conflicting goals of effectiveness (trying to acquire the best information possible), and efficiency (not wasting time and money on costly information acquisition that is not needed). Consequently, it is important for the person to balance acquisition costs against improved completeness and accuracy of information. Unfortunately, in design problems in particular, costs may be difficult to identify, while benefits are often realized only in the long term. Often, the value of a piece of information cannot be determined until much later in the decision-making process, if at all.
Experimental results indicate that humans do not balance information costs and benefits well (Connolly and Gilani, 1982; Connolly and Thorn, 1987; Pitz, Reinhold, and Geller, 1969) .
Generally, decision makers fall victim to two types of acquisition errors: overacquiring and underacquiring (Connolly and Thorn, 1987) . Both types of errors are the result of sub-optimal application of stopping rules. Overacquisition and underacquisition of information have received considerable attention in the general decision making literature (e.g., Ackoff, 1967; Connolly and Gilani, 1982; Hershman and Levine, 1970; Pitz and Barrett, 1969) . Overacquiring involves gathering more information than is needed, causing excessive acquisition costs. In requirements determination for systems development, overacquisition results in wasted time and resources in the gathering and analysis of requirements. Underacquiring, on the other hand, results in a deficiency in acquired information, creating the need for more acquisition later or a risk of decision error (if no additional information is gathered). Underacquisition of information during requirements determination results in an incomplete view of the goals and functionality of the proposed system, leading to potential design problems, iterative redesign, implementation difficulties, and possible system failure. The costs associated with discovering information inadequacy during the latter stages of systems development (and in decision making more generally) are typically several orders of magnitude higher than problems discovered during information gathering (Boehm, 1981 , Shemer, 1987 . Therefore, it is arguable that the costs of underspecification are much greater than the costs of overspecification when the entire decision-making problem is considered.
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The concept of stopping rules has been investigated extensively in decision-making theory and optional stopping contexts. Numerous normative stopping rules have been recognized (Busemeyer and Rapoport, 1988; ; see also Goodie et al., 1999) . For example, past research has identified stopping rules based on the economic value of information (Spetzler and Staël von Holstein, 1975) , the expected value of additional information (Kogut, 1990) , and the expected loss from terminating information acquisition (Busemeyer and Rapoport, 1988) . However, these normative models usually fail to describe the actual behavior of decision makers. The computations required by these optimal stopping rules imply that the decision maker must "think ahead" to the final decision to be able to assess the value of additional information (Busemeyer and Rapoport, 1988) . Thinking ahead, however, is cognitively difficult for people due to the limited capacity of working memory. The decision maker is unable to hold and evaluate enough information in working memory to consider all possible outcomes fully. 2 Furthermore, evidence suggests that a decision maker's planning horizon is seriously restricted (Rapoport, 1966) . Consequently, people may fail to appreciate dependencies and interactions between future events.
There is evidence that people perform sub-optimally when acquiring information as a result of these cognitive challenges. This sub-optimal performance includes stopping acquisition too soon (Baron et al., 1988; Perkins et al., 1983; Rapoport and Tversky, 1970; Seale and Rapoport, 1997) , failing to access relevant information (Fischhoff, 1977; Shafir and Tversky, 1992) , failing to consider all appropriate alternatives (Farquhar and Pratkanis, 1993) , and underestimating the amount of missing information (Fischhoff et al., 1978) . Further, prior research in choice tasks has shown that people's knowledge about their own stopping behavior is not reliable in terms of judgmental accuracy, and such stopping behavior may even be arbitrary (Browne et al., 1999 , in the context of categorization of choices).
Descriptive Stopping Rules
As a result of the failure of normative models to describe the stopping behavior of individuals accurately, stopping rules have been proposed that attempt to represent the actual cognitive processes of people as opposed to the idealized processes required by the normative models. As noted earlier, many researchers have studied stopping rules used in choice problems. Typical choice situations studied have included choosing an apartment to rent (Saad and Russo, 1996) , selecting a one-year subscription to a choice of magazines (Schmalhofer et al., 1986) , and choosing a summer vacation venue (Bockenholt et al., 1991) .
In choice problems, numerous stopping rules have been found to be descriptive of individual behavior in at least some contexts. For example, Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1999) have suggested three simple stopping rules that they term "The Minimalist," "Take the Last," and "Take the Best."
All three rules focus on examining information cues to make a choice. "The Minimalist" and "Take the Last" rules require the decision maker to choose an alternative based only on the first positive cue value he encounters. The "Take the Best" strategy is a variant on the lexicographic choice strategy, requiring the decision maker first to order the cues according to their validity in predicting the item of interest, and then to choose according to the first cue that provides discriminability.
Additionally, Aschenbrenner, Albert, and Schmalhofer (1984; see also Schmalhofer et al., 1986) proposed a "stochastic dimension selection" model, which states that binary choice is a process in which sequential comparisons are made between two alternatives on a number of attributes. Once the evidence supporting one of the choices exceeds some previously-defined level, that alternative is selected. Finally, Saad and Russo (1996) proposed the "Core Attributes" heuristic, which states that a person will stop acquiring information and commit to an alternative after having found information on all of his or her important attributes.
All these stopping heuristics have been shown to be useful under certain choice conditions. However, their general utility appears confined to choice problems, as all focus on the convergence to a single alternative. None has been directly applied in design problems, in which the focus is on the sufficiency of information gathered for design (although, as we discuss below, generalizations of the Aschenbrenner et al. (1984) and Saad and Russo (1996) rules are useful in design problems).
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Therefore, for the current research, we sought different stopping rules.
A set of stopping rules described by Nickles, Curley, and Benson (1995) are proposed to be more useful in design search problems, in which the goal is not to choose between existing alternatives, but rather to decide whether to terminate the information gathering process. All four rules are aimed at assessing the sufficiency of information collected. These rules rely on psychologically distinct processes, although all require that the decision maker be able to distinguish a new and useful piece of information or evidence from information that is either already known or is irrelevant to the problem at hand. These rules are discussed in detail in the following paragraphs.
Magnitude Threshold Stopping Rule. The magnitude threshold stopping rule assumes that a person's degree of belief concerning the sufficiency of evidence must reach some predetermined level, or threshold, before he will stop gathering information (Nickles et al., 1995; see also Wald, 1947) . A decision maker sets a mental threshold of necessary information on a key dimension that acts as the stopping criterion. He then maintains a mental "running total" of the cumulative impact of the evidence (Gettys and Fisher, 1979) . When the internal tabulation crosses the intended threshold, the acquisition of additional evidence is terminated.
The psychological ability to set a threshold criterion and to judge when it has been exceeded is familiar in a variety of research contexts, ranging from judgments in psychophysical tasks (Swensson and Thomas, 1974) to decision making under uncertainty (Busemeyer, 1982) to signal detection theory (Green and Swets, 1974) . There is also evidence of the descriptive usefulness of threshold models in everyday choice tasks (e.g., Aschenbrenner et al., 1984; Saad and Russo, 1996) .
We expect that the magnitude threshold rule, a sufficiency threshold model, may be descriptive of stopping behavior in design tasks. An abstract representation of the magnitude threshold stopping rule is shown in Figure 1 . **Insert Figure 1 about here** Difference Threshold Stopping Rule. Using the difference threshold stopping rule, a decision maker assesses the marginal value of the latest piece of information acquired (Nickles et al., 1995) .
A cumulative assessment is made after the acquisition of each additional piece of information. Then, a comparison is made between the cumulative assessment after the most recently acquired information and the cumulative assessment prior to the last item. When the difference between the two assessments is less than a predetermined difference amount, the person stops the information acquisition process. Pragmatically, the difference threshold stopping rule motivates the decision maker to stop gathering information when he judges that he is no longer learning anything new. A graphical view of the difference threshold stopping rule is presented in Figure (Bartlett, 1932; Schank and Abelson, 1977) , and is a generalization of the Core Attributes heuristic proposed by Saad and Russo (1996) . As information is obtained, arguments are made for or against using each piece of information to fulfill requirements on a mental list. Once the decision maker reasons that all of the items contained on the list or set have been attained, the gathering of additional information ceases. (Nickles et al., 1995) . Such a representation provides a framework within which new information or evidence can be assimilated (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Schank and Abelson, 1977) . Psychologically, this rule requires the ability to reason whether a new and different piece of information should cause the person's mental representation to change. As new information is obtained, arguments are developed that either support the use of the information to modify the representation or reject the use of the information. When the person's mental representation of the problem is no longer being developed, he ceases acquisition of additional information (Yates and Carlson, 1982 ). An abstract illustration of the representational stability stopping rule is depicted in Figure 4 . **Insert Figure 4 about here** These four stopping rules are arguably more appropriate in information search problems than other stopping rules proposed in the literature because they focus on the completeness or sufficiency of information obtained rather than on choosing between existing alternatives. They are therefore proposed to help understand analysts' stopping behavior in the present research.
The Role of Experience in Stopping Rule Use
An issue of importance to both theory and practice is the role of analyst experience in stopping rule use. From a theoretical standpoint, it is known that a person's procedures for performing a task generally change as he gains experience (Anderson, 1981; Simon, 1981) . This is as true for systems development as it is for other domains (Schenk et al., 1998) . Thus, it seems probable that the stopping rules used by more experienced analysts will differ from those used by less experienced analysts.
We anticipate that the mental list and magnitude threshold rules will be used by more experienced analysts. The mental list rule requires that an analyst have enough experience to be able to construct a meaningful list of requirements, even if he is working in an application area in which he has little domain knowledge. It is unlikely that less experienced analysts will have this ability.
Further, more experienced analysts should have good heuristics for knowing how much information is enough to design a system, and so should have confidence in setting a magnitude threshold for information. For an analyst with limited experience, establishing a magnitude threshold level a priori can be an intimidating and fruitless prospect.
On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect that the difference threshold and representational stability rules will be used by less experienced analysts. The difference threshold stopping rule seems to require less experience on the part of the analyst. When using this rule, there is no need for the analyst to know how much information is enough. He simply stops the information acquisition when he is no longer learning anything new, without regard to volume. Further, the use of the representational stability rule also appears to require a relatively lower level of experience. The analyst does not have to form a mental list or set a magnitude threshold a priori; rather, he simply continues collecting information until his mental representation of the problem becomes stable.
The Impact of Analyst Experience on Information Gathered
We anticipate that the amount of information gathered will not be directly affected by the experience level of the analyst. Past research has demonstrated that experienced decision makers exhibit better judgments than novices, but they do so without using more information (see, e.g., Connolly and Gilani, 1982; Shanteau, 1992) . Some research has shown that experienced decision makers are in fact distracted by too much information, and that too much information can interfere with decision making (Gaeth and Shanteau, 1984; Glazer et al., 1992) . In information systems development in particular, some studies focusing on differences between experienced and novice analysts have shown that experience is an indicator of improved performance (Davis, 1982; Schenk et al., 1998; Walz et al., 1993) . However, other research has demonstrated that high and low experienced analysts are equally likely to elicit incomplete and inaccurate requirements (Marakas and Elam, 1998) . Even the elicitation of higher quality requirements is not necessarily to be expected from more experienced analysts in information systems development. Research has shown that higher levels of experience may result in a tendency to infer requirements rather than to elicit them explicitly (Miyake and Norman 1979) . Based on these findings, we expect that more experienced analysts will not gather more information than less experienced analysts. Instead, we expect that the stopping rule utilized will determine the amount and quality of information gathered.
MEASURING INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
Since the goal of the analyst in a design process is to obtain a sufficient amount of information, we next provide ways to measure the information elicited and describe how we operationalized sufficiency.
In the context of information systems development, Byrd, Cossick, and Zmud (1992) proposed a taxonomy of requirements that was later expanded upon by Rogich (1997; see also Browne and Rogich, 2001 ). This categorization scheme includes problem domain entities believed to be critical for the successful design of an information system (Byrd et al., 1992) . 4 Thus, an ideal set of requirements for information systems would arguably include a significant number of requirements from each of the defined categories. In the Byrd et al. -Rogich taxonomy, requirements are organized into four levels: goals, processes, tasks, and information. Goal level requirements focus on understanding the overall context in which the system is being developed and the organizational goals for the system. In process level requirements, emphasis is placed on analyses of business activities. Task level requirements concentrate on the specific steps that are required to fulfill the business activities and how they are influenced by events in the environment. Finally, the information level requirements are based on a complete understanding of the domain's data needs and data relationships. These generic requirements categories arguably pertain to any system development effort and many other problem domains (Browne and Rogich, 2001 ). Therefore, we used this classification technique as one method for capturing requirements elicited in the present study. Figure 5 illustrates the requirement categories and subcategories. **Insert Figure 5 about here** In this study we measure sufficiency by the quantity and quality of requirements gathered.
Quantity is measured in three ways. First, we measured the total number of requirements elicited by an analyst. We also measured the breadth and depth of requirements. Breadth refers to the number of different requirements categories that were utilized, and depth of requirements refers to the number of requirements elicited within each requirements category. A more complete set of requirements would comprise a broad range of requirement categories and explore each of these categories in depth.
To measure the quality of requirements, a different coding scheme was necessary. 5 Quality is best assessed using a coding scheme that reflects the content and context of the problem situation (see, e.g., Browne et al.,1997) , rather than a generic context-independent requirements list. To facilitate this coding, we first developed a list of content categories. The task used in this study was the development of an on-line grocery shopping application (discussed below). To develop the content categories, we performed a task analysis of the experimental task and examined requirements elicited from subjects in a previous study that used the same task (Browne and Rogich, 2001 ). The coding scheme was then given to five employees at a large regional grocery chain in Texas. The employees were asked to rate each category in the coding scheme using the following rating scale: H1a: The use of some stopping rules will result in different quantities of requirements than the use of others.
H1b: The use of some stopping rules will result in different breadth of requirements than the use of others.
H1c: The use of some stopping rules will result in different depth of requirements than the use of others.
H2: The use of some stopping rules will result in different quality of requirements than the use of others.
To understand the impact of experience on stopping rule use, we tested the following hypotheses:
H3a: A greater number of experienced analysts will use the mental list rule than will use the representational stability rule.
H3b: A greater number of experienced analysts will use the mental list rule than will use the difference threshold rule.
H3c: A greater number of experienced analysts will use the magnitude threshold rule than will use the representational stability rule.
H3d: A greater number of experienced analysts will use the magnitude threshold rule than will use the difference threshold rule.
To test the impact of experience on quantity and quality of requirements, we proposed the following hypotheses:
H4a: There will be no relationship between the experience of the analyst and the quantity of requirements elicited.
H4b: There will be no relationship between the experience of the analyst and the breadth of requirements elicited.
H4c: There will be no relationship between the experience of the analyst and the depth of requirements elicited.
H4d: There will be no relationship between the experience of the analyst and the quality of requirements elicited.
METHODOLOGY
Participants and Procedure
The participants for this study were 54 practicing information systems analysts who were recruited from organizations in the Baltimore metropolitan area. Analysts from twelve different organizations participated, representing a variety of industry segments including banking, finance, insurance, construction, manufacturing, aerospace, government, research, and education. Only analysts with at least two years of experience in system development projects were eligible to participate in the study. This condition was used to help ensure that analysts had been involved in enough system development projects to possess fully developed heuristics for terminating the requirement determination process, which is the focus of this study.
The experiment utilized a case scenario concerning the development of an on-line grocery shopping information system. The familiarity of grocery shopping in general increased the likelihood of a similar level of domain knowledge across all analysts. It was expected that the novelty of on-line grocery shopping would provide a challenge to the systems analysts in identifying requirements for the system and ensure a realistic requirements gathering process.
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Analysts performed the task individually, and all sessions were tape recorded. Each analyst was asked to vocalize his thoughts as he generated requests for information and evaluated responses.
A research assistant was the proposed system "user" in the scenario, assuming the role of a grocery store manager. The same user was employed for all analysts. This user was thoroughly briefed concerning requirements for the system, and was a person unfamiliar with systems development and blind to the hypotheses of the study. During the experimental session, the analyst made requests for information concerning requirements for the proposed system and the user responded with a statement of information that directly addressed the analyst's request. The analyst continued gathering information from the user to the point at which he felt sufficient information had been obtained to continue with the design of the scenario system.
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The analyst was then asked to complete a self-reporting questionnaire designed to assist with the ensuing evaluation of the stopping heuristic used by the analyst. Finally, the analyst was de-briefed.
Data Analysis
A transcribed verbal protocol of each analyst's requirements gathering session was used to identify the specific requirements elicited from the user. To utilize the protocols, they were parsed and then coded into requirements categories based on the Byrd et al.-Rogich taxonomy. The protocols were parsed by identifying blocks of utterances in which the participant was discussing the same idea or issue Reichman-Adar, 1984 ). An independent coder unfamiliar with the purposes of the research was used to code all of the parsed transcriptions. In addition, to assess the reliability of the initial coding, a second independent coder was asked to code a random sample of 10 analyst transcriptions. A comparison of the results revealed that, on average, the coders assigned 82% of the requirements to the same categories. To assess the degree of interrater agreement not attributable to chance, Cohen's kappa was calculated (Everitt, 1996) . The kappa coefficient for these data was .701, which is considered "substantial" agreement under the guidelines established by Landis and Koch (1977) . Considering the number of categories and complexity of the utterances, this level of agreement is considered quite reliable (Everitt, 1996) . The results of the coding performed by the primary coder were used in the data analysis.
The verbal protocols of each analyst's session were also used, along with the self-reporting questionnaires, to determine the stopping rule applied by the analyst. Utterances and statements reflecting stopping behavior were analyzed and coded into stopping rule categories based on the characteristics of the stopping rules presented above. Two independent coders unfamiliar with the purposes of the research were used to code the stopping rules. A comparison of the coding results indicated that 89% of the analysts were coded into the same stopping rule category by the coders.
Again, Cohen's kappa was calculated to assess the degree of interrater agreement not attributable to chance. The kappa coefficient for these data was .849, which is considered "perfect" agreement by Landis and Koch (1977) . For instances in which the coders disagreed, the disagreements were resolved by the two coders through discussion.
The verbal protocols were also used to code the data into content categories to permit the analysis of requirements quality. One researcher working independently coded all of the content of the protocols into categories. To check the reliability of the coding, a second researcher also working independently coded a random sample of 22 protocols into the content categories. Interrater reliability for the coding was 83%. Considering the complexity of coding verbal utterances, and the number of available categories, this reliability was deemed satisfactory. The codes from the first coder was used in the analyses.
To facilitate the assessment of requirements quality, the content categories used by each subject were compared to the quality assessments made by the grocery store employees. The specified number of points was assigned for each category on the coding scheme discussed by a subject. This provided a measure of "quality points" for each subject that could be compared across stopping rule groups.
RESULTS
Stopping Rule Use
All analysts were determined by the coders to have used one of the four stopping rules proposed by Nickles et al. (1995) (an available "other" stopping rule category was not utilized by the coders). The number of analysts using each stopping rule was as follows: Difference Threshold = 22; Representational Stability = 13; Mental List = 10; Magnitude Threshold = 9.
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Requirements Elicited by Stopping Rule
To test whether analysts utilizing a particular stopping rule obtained significantly greater quantity, breadth, depth, and/or quality of requirements than analysts applying other stopping rules, analysts were grouped by the stopping rule utilized and comparisons were made between groups.
The results are shown in Table 1 . **Insert Table 1 about here** First, the quantity of requirements was determined by examining the total number of requirements gathered by the analysts. An analysis of variance revealed that there was a marginally significant difference in the total number of requirements obtained between the stopping rule groups (F (3,50) = 2.72; p = .05). Multiple comparisons revealed two marginal differences; analysts using the mental list rule elicited significantly more requirements than analysts using the magnitude threshold rule, and analysts using the difference threshold rule elicited more requirements than analysts using the magnitude threshold rule. No other differences were significant. These results offer support for Hypothesis 1a.
Next, the breadth of requirements elicited by analysts was determined. An analysis of variance showed no significant differences (F (3,50) = 1.723; p = .174). All analysts, regardless of the stopping rule used, exhibited the same breadth of elicited requirements during the experimental sessions. Thus, Hypothesis 1b is not supported. On average, analysts elicited requirements from 57% of the available categories (15.41 of 27 possible), a point we return to in the discussion section.
For the depth variable, the mental list and magnitude threshold stopping rule groups showed serious violations of the equality of variance assumption. Thus, the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test for equality of means was administered (Conover, 1999) . The analysis of the data indicated that there was a significant difference in depth of requirements between the stopping rule groups (χ 2 (3) = 8.978; p = .03). Multiple comparisons showed that both the difference threshold and mental list stopping rules resulted in significantly more depth of requirements than the representational stability stopping rule and the magnitude threshold rule. These results offer support for Hypothesis 1c.
To test for the quality of requirements elicited, the results from the content coding scheme were utilized. The mean numbers of quality points for subjects using each stopping rule are shown in Table 2 . An analysis of variance showed that there were significant differences between some of the groups (F (3,53) = 2.99; p = .040). The Tukey multiple comparison procedure showed a significant difference in quality of requirements elicited by analysts using the difference threshold rule and the magnitude threshold rule. This difference supports Hypothesis 2. No other differences in means were significant. As a further note, there were 230 total quality points available on the content coding scheme. Subjects on average elicited requirements associated with 62.6 quality points, an average of 27.2% of the quality points available. **Insert Table 2 about here**
The implications of these findings for information gathering theory and systems analysis practice are significant, and we return to this issue in the discussion section.
Influence of Experience on Stopping Rule Use
As noted above, one potential explanation for differences in stopping rule usage is different experience levels of analysts. Although we required all analysts to have at least two years of experience in systems analysis to participate, there were large differences in experience level (the range of experience was 2 to 32 years).
To test whether any differences existed in stopping rule use as a result of years of experience, we first calculated the mean years as an analyst by stopping rule used. The means were as follows: were not significant; users of the mental list rule were not significantly more experienced than users of the difference threshold rule (t (30) = 1.21; p = .119), nor were users of the magnitude threshold rule more experienced than users of the difference threshold rule (t (29) = 1.04; p = .152). Thus, Hypotheses 3b and 3d are not supported.
Influence of Experience on Requirements Elicited
To test the impact of analyst experience on requirements gathered, we calculated correlation coefficients for the relationships between experience and quantity of requirements, breadth of requirements, depth of requirements, and quality of requirements. Analysts' years of experience were unrelated to the total number of requirements elicited (Pearson's r = .08; p = .59). This provides support for Hypothesis 4a; more experienced analysts gathered no more requirements than less experienced analysts. Breadth of requirements (r = .15; p = .27) and depth of requirements (r = .02; p = .91) were also unrelated to analysts' years of experience. Therefore, Hypotheses 4b and 4c are also supported. The relationship between number of years of analyst experience and number of quality points for requirements elicited was also investigated using the content coding scheme. The data showed that the years of experience of an analyst were unrelated to the number of quality points associated with the requirements elicited (r = .09; p = .53). This supports Hypothesis 4d. Together, these results show that analyst experience was not an important factor in the gathering of requirements.
DISCUSSION
This research has identified the stopping rules used by systems analysts in a design problem task. As noted, stopping rules in design-related contexts have been studied much less than stopping rules in choice problems. The current findings thus help fill a significant gap in our understanding of individual behavior in the full decision-making process. Further, our results provide a link between the information gathering process and the subsequent choice process in decision making. The analysts in our study stopped after eliciting requirements from only 57% of the generic categories considered important for developing a system, and earned only 27% of the quality points available in the content categorization scheme. These data provide potential evidence and explanation for a number of the shortcomings of normative models of decision making (e.g., failure to use relevant information and failure to consider appropriate alternatives).
The study of stopping rule use across varying levels of experience is another important contribution of the present research. Heuristics for reducing options in choice tasks as a result of experience or expertise have been investigated in a variety of contexts (e.g., chess (Baylor and Simon, 1966) , the stock market (Borges et al., 1999) ). However, no prior studies have identified stopping rule use as a function of experience in design problems. Our findings showed that more experienced analysts used the mental list and magnitude threshold stopping rule more often, while less experienced analysts were more likely to utilize the representational stability stopping rule. The results are not surprising given that less experienced problem solvers are more likely to use heuristics that have face validity and are easy to apply. As noted earlier, the representational stability stopping rule is arguably less cognitively demanding and thus applied more easily by less experienced systems analysts.
Further, our result showing that the amount and quality of information gathered is not affected by experience is consistent with some prior research (e.g., Marakas and Elam, 1998; Miyake and Norman, 1979; Shanteau, 1992) and inconsistent with the findings of others (e.g., Schenk et al., 1998; Walz et al., 1993) . Our findings indicate that experience is not a significant determinant of information gathering success, at least in the present context. From our findings, the stopping rule employed by the analyst is the critical factor. This result has several important implications. First, it suggests that information gathering can be enhanced through training, since stopping rules can be taught to analysts. Second, it indicates that staffing choices for information gathering tasks should not be based on experience alone.
In terms of information gathering outcomes, our findings showed that the use of the mental list and difference threshold stopping rules resulted in (1) greater quantity of requirements than the magnitude threshold rule, and (2) greater depth of requirements than the magnitude threshold and representational stability rules. Further, the difference threshold rule was more successful in terms of quality than the magnitude threshold rule. This is particularly interesting since one of the more successful stopping rules was more characteristic of experienced analysts (mental list rule) and one was more characteristic of less experienced analysts (difference threshold rule). However, this result is not inconsistent with research findings in problem solving. Because of such factors as training, cognitive abilities, and personality traits, some experienced problem solvers develop better heuristics for performing tasks than others; on the other hand, some less experienced problem solvers are able to perform tasks well despite their lack of experience, due to application of general problem-solving heuristics that work well much of the time (Newell and Simon, 1972; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1993; Smith, 1998; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) . It is possible that the difference threshold rule, used successfully in the current problem-solving task, is a problem-solving heuristic that works well with inexperienced analysts in general.
Our results concerning the magnitude threshold rule and mental list rule can be compared to previous findings in choice problems. As noted earlier, the magnitude threshold rule is one generalization of the threshold model (the stochastic dimension selection (SDS) model) proposed by Aschenbrenner et al. (1984) . Aschenbrenner et al. found good fit for the SDS model in choice tasks ranging from deciding on a vacation area to renting a car. In the present research, the magnitude threshold model was used by more experienced analysts, but resulted in fewer and lower quality requirements elicited. The mental list rule is a generalization of the Core Attributes (CA) heuristic discussed by Saad and Russo (1996) . Saad and Russo found the CA heuristic descriptive of subjects'
behavior in an apartment rental choice task. In our study, the mental list rule was used by more experienced analysts and resulted in relatively greater quantity of requirements elicited by analysts.
Although our results tempt more in-depth comparisons with these previous studies, the important differences in the purposes of the search behavior make such comparisons hazardous. Extensions of the current research could investigate links between the application of stopping rules in the design process and specific problems in choice.
From a practical standpoint, the current research contributes important knowledge toward solving a critical difficulty in decision-making efforts. In information systems development, underspecification or mis-specification of system requirements during information gathering is an enormous problem that costs companies more than $100 billion per year (Ewusi-Mensah, 1997; Standish Group, 1996) . The failure to gather appropriate information leads to design and implementation problems and poor decisions in projects in many other industries as well (see, e.g., Wetherbe, 1997) . Understanding the stopping rules used by decision makers to gather information is an important step in reducing these problems.
The distinction between stopping rule use in design and choice problems has not been widely discussed in the literature. However, as we have pointed out, there are numerous reasons to make such a distinction. Further investigations of stopping rules in a variety of task types and conditions will continue to improve our understanding of decision makers' stopping behavior during information search. * Note: The breadth mean multiplied by the depth mean is not equal to the quantity mean for each stopping rule group because the quantity mean is a weighted average of breadth and depth. The breadth and depth means reported are simple averages within groups. 
